In 1972, 11 Israeli athletes were murdered by the PLO at the Munich Olympics. Secrecy remains one of the Mossad's essential characteristics, but Ostrovsky argues that damage done by his scrutiny is minor compared with the damage that the Mossad does to itself by operating beyond public inspection. The book (written with Claire Hoy) also charges that the Mossad eavesdropped on ambassadors' conversations at the United Nations. vital intelligence that could have averted the 1983 suicide bombing of the Beirut barracks that killed 241 Marines. Ostrovsky's charges include an allegation that the Mossad failed to share with the U.S. The Israeli government failed in its attempt to have the book banned, and its publication shocked not only Mossad but also the CIA and other intelligence services that worked with the Israelis. In his four years as an agent, Ostrovsky kept a diary, believing that he had a duty to reveal "the twisted ideals and self-centered pragmatism that I encountered inside the Mossad." He names many of its agents and station chiefs, and he identifies its codes, locations of safe houses and operational methods, including assassination and blackmail. Victor Ostrovsky is the Mossad's first whistleblower-or betrayer, depending on your point of view. Perhaps most striking is his description of the complex interplay between intelligence and policy making, offering insights worth keeping in mind as Israel faces new threats and challenges today. Halevy shows how he worked to rebuild confidence. "Much scorn and ridicule was poured on the service," shaking the confidence of those serving in the ranks. The second was a failed operation in Switzerland, when a Mossad officer was arrested trying to wiretap the phone of a suspected terrorist. The first was the attempt to assassinate Khalid Mishal, the spiritual leader of Hamas. He writes with surprising candor about his work and mounts a determined defense of the service against accusations that it has a dangerous degree of autonomy: "There must be an intimacy that is constantly nurtured between the intelligence leader and his political leader." Halevy came to office in the aftermath of two Mossad failures. The book is also a timely study of personal rivalries within the Israeli intelligence community, where, then as now, spymasters and the political leadership squabbled over the meaning of morality, justice and responsibility.Įfraim Halevy was the director-general of Mossad from 1998 to 2002, a period of crisis that saw five Israeli prime ministers come and go, even as the threat of Islamic terror rose. The result is a neat combination of headline-making stories and shrewd analyses of episodes that include Israeli agents hunting down Nazi war criminals killing Hitler's scientists who were working to produce rockets for Egypt rescuing Israeli hostages from Entebbe airport in Uganda pinpointing Iraq's nuclear reactor for a surgical air strike and waging war on the streets of Europe against Arab terrorists-all recounted with great narrative skill. Two decades ago, he collaborated with Benny Morris, a professor of Middle East Studies at Ben-Gurion University in Israel, on this history of Israel's intelligence efforts from 1948 to the Gulf War. Ian Black, currently the Guardian's Middle East editor, covered the region for years as a foreign correspondent. Thomas's books include 'Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of Mossad,' recently published in an updated edition. He writes with refreshing economy about espionage and sabotage undertaken by his unit, where the atmosphere was tense, Mardor writes, "as it always was when explosive toys were being put together by a skilled technician who was being required to solve problems under pressure." The book provides a fascinating look at clandestine operations that Mardor planned and executed, using methods that would become standard for Mossad. Mardor, who joined a forerunner of Mossad in the 1930s, when it was an underground force engaged in an undeclared war against Arab terrorism during the British Mandate in Palestine. It is engraved with hundreds of names, and there is space for hundreds more, if necessary, to be carved with pride for agents sent to carry out the Mossad motto: "By way of Deception thou shalt do war." The words reflect the Israeli intelligence organization's heroic myth-an image burnished by "Haganah," a memoir by Munya M. The Mossadmemorial at its Glilot headquarters north of Tel Aviv is a concrete maze that takes the form of a human brain.
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